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Revolution and Aftermath:
B.C. Health Services and Its
Implications
Robin K. Basu*

I. DISCLAIMER AND CONSTRAINTS
The thoughts presented in this paper are offered with a disclaimer
and some limiting constraints that should be stated at the outset.
First, the disclaimer: the observations in this paper emerge from the
crucible of defeat in litigation. The writer was counsel for an intervening
provincial Attorney General in the B.C. Health Services1 case. Although
the province’s intervention was agnostic about the wisdom of the British
Columbia legislation at issue, it was opposed to the expansion of section
2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 that was called for
by the health care unions. The intervention focused on the implications for
both public and private sector labour relations, section 2(d) and section
15(1) jurisprudence and Charter jurisprudence generally. The government
side was successful in resisting the section 15(1) Charter claim in B.C.
Health Services, but the decision on section 2(d) represents a set-back for
government’s ability to set public policy without the spectre of
constitutional litigation and judicial intervention.
Second, the writer is a practising government counsel and his views
are necessarily informed by the perspective of being “in government”,
and thus, of being aware of the challenges governments and their
advisers confront as a result of constitutional uncertainty. The writer’s
*

Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. The
views and doubts expressed in this paper are the writer’s own and are expressed in his personal
capacity only. They are not to be taken as the views of the Government of Ontario. The writer is
indebted to his very smart colleagues and friends, including in particular Robert Charney, with
whom he has spent much time trying to tease out the meaning and implications of the brave new s.
2(d) world.
1
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”].
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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perspective is that of someone whose job it is to try to assist government
achieve its public policy objectives within the ambit of constitutional
limits. When constitutional limits cannot be delineated with a tolerable
degree of certainty, governments and their advisers are naturally
frustrated.
Third, governments face pressing labour issues, in both the public
and private sectors, virtually every day. As counsel to government on
these live issues, the writer cannot speak his mind freely on all the
implications raised by B.C. Health Services. As a result, the writer may
be somewhat more reserved here in elaborating the dangers of the B.C.
Health Services revolution in labour and public policy than he is when
discussing the matter with his colleagues.

II. AN UNSATISFACTORY REVOLUTION
It was immediately recognized that the decision in B.C. Health
Services represents a revolution in the Supreme Court’s thinking about
section 2(d) and labour relations.
As with revolutions in general, however, after the initial euphoria —
or panic — associated with dramatic and perhaps unexpected change,
there are inevitable questions about what the future holds. In the case of
B.C. Health Services, these questions come from all quarters: organized
labour, management (both public and private sector) and government
itself.
Like a revolution, B.C. Health Services appears to be more a
rejection of the old order than an articulated vision of the future. It is
hard to discern what comes next, where we are headed. The
jurisprudential structure of the past has been swept away, with very little
guidance as to what is expected to replace it. We do not know if the
Court was unable to give us better guidance because the justices were
unable to come to agreement on a direction forward and the judgment
we have is the best achievable consensus. It is possible that they did not
offer more as it was not necessary to do so to dispose of the case.
Another possibility is that the judgment was crafted to create legal
uncertainty for unions, employers and government, so as to encourage
these parties to bargain their differences in lieu of litigating or
legislating. If this latter possibility is in fact the case, only time will tell
whether the gambit will succeed.
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III. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM
We begin with what the writer believes to be at the root of the
problems posed by the B.C. Health Services decision. It is a fundamental
misconception that treats the activity of collective bargaining as an
exercise of freedom. From this misconception the problems and
unresolved questions of the decision arise.
With B.C. Health Services the Supreme Court has taken an activity,
collective bargaining, that was thought to be part and parcel of a
comprehensive statutory regime — with correlative rights and obligations,
and a fair measure of statutory prescription (some would call it coercion)
— and reinterpreted it as the exercise of a fundamental freedom under the
Charter.
Yet if a formal amendment process had been undertaken to extend
constitutional protection to the modern statutory role of organized labour
in collective bargaining (or if the matter had been given thorough
consideration when the Charter was enacted),3 this writer posits that such
constitutional protection would most likely not have found expression as
a fundamental freedom, i.e., in section 2 of the Charter. The fundamental
freedoms — of conscience, religion, expression, association, peaceful
assembly — are quintessentially liberal protections.4 Protections for the
modern statutory role of organized labour — at least as far as collective
bargaining is concerned — are not. Collective bargaining is, to put it
simply, a poor fit in section 2.
If a considered decision had been made to include collective
bargaining rights under the Charter, they would likely have been
included in a separate section, or group of sections, entitled Labour
Rights, or Labour Protections or Collective Bargaining Rights. Such
provisions would have specified with some degree of particularity: (a)
who is the right holder (a union member, union, or some other
collectivity); (b) to what extent do the labour rights impose correlative
3

That is, consideration beyond the motion before the Special Joint Parliamentary
Committee to add to s. 2(d) the words “including the freedom to organize and bargain collectively”,
which was defeated by a vote of 20-2. See Dianne Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour Law and the
Charter” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 369, at 371. It was in opposing this motion that the Acting
Minister of Justice made a comment upon which the Court has now placed so much weight: B.C.
Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 67. See discussion below.
4
Despite some halting steps towards the recognition of “positive rights” within s. 2(b) and
2(d), s. 2 rights are still generally, and the writer would submit correctly, understood as restraints on
government authority and action: Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673
(S.C.C.), Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”].
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obligations on governments and private sector actors; (c) what is the
relationship between various labour rights holders — what are their
mutual rights and obligations; (d) what is the relationship between
collective agreements and democratically enacted laws; and (e) what
limits, including the economic and budgetary constraints of private and
public sector actors, may legitimately affect protected labour rights.
What we have instead, as a result of the Court’s reinterpretation of
collective bargaining as an exercise of fundamental freedom, is that the
Charter has effectively been amended by judicial decision to add an
entirely new breed of “fundamental freedom”, constitutionally
guaranteeing what was formerly only the statutory role of organized
labour. Indeed, based on some of the Court’s comments it is possible
that what has been inserted in section 2(d) of the Charter is a nascent
constitutional labour code — albeit one whose terms, rather than being
spelled out clearly in the manner of the Labour Relations Act,5 must be
discerned by a mix of extrapolation, inference and conjecture.
In the writer’s respectful view, the nine operative words of section
2(d) — “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: … (d)
freedom of association” — cannot do this much work. Neither is section
1, certainly as it has been interpreted to date, a well-crafted tool for
delineating the circumstances in which the public interest or even
balanced labour policy can take priority over collective bargaining
rights.

IV. SOME UNION ACTIVITIES ARE AN EXERCISE OF
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The misconception about collective bargaining begins by mixing up
those activities of labour unions that truly are exercises of freedom of
association with those that unions undertake pursuant to a statutorily
assigned role.
No one doubts that organizing efforts by a labour union to grow its
membership are associational. Unions attempt to persuade individuals to
join them in common cause to achieve a variety of goals. Where an
individual has a choice as to whether or not he or she wishes to establish,
join, or remain in, a union, this is clearly an exercise of freedom of
association, and this is no different in respect of any voluntary association,
whether it be a political party, a trade association, a lobby group or a social
5

In Ontario: Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A.
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or other club. State interference with such organizing activities (“the
freedom to establish and maintain an association”) engages section 2(d).
This is not controversial, and was easily recognized by the Court from the
early days of its section 2(d) jurisprudence.6
Similarly, if the group pursuit of an activity is prohibited or
restricted, whereas the individual pursuit of the same activity is not, this
also engages section 2(d), and this again has long been recognized in the
Court’s section 2(d) jurisprudence.7

V. PROBLEMS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL ANALOGUE TEST: DUNMORE
Where the Court may arguably have taken a wrong turn in its early
section 2(d) jurisprudence was in treating these two categories of section
2(d) protection as virtually exhaustive.8 In particular, it was thought that
6

Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987]
1 S.C.R. 313, at 363, per Dickson C.J.C., 391, per LeDain J. and 407, per McIntyre J. (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Alberta Reference”]; Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v.
Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at 401-402
(S.C.C.), per Sopinka J. [hereinafter “Professional Institute”].
7
Alberta Reference, id., at 407-409, per McIntyre J., and Professional Institute, id., at
401-402. The controversy that often arises in relation to this category of s. 2(d) protection is not
with respect to its inclusion within the scope of s. 2(d), but in its application in particular cases. It
may be contended, for example, that a state prohibition on certain forms of business or trade
association is aimed at preventing a group from doing what is lawful for individuals. For example, it
is said that preventing or restricting a multi-disciplinary partnership between different groups of
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, engages s. 2(d), because the practice of law and
accountancy are lawful activities permitted to qualified individuals. The answer to this contention is
that law and accountancy are also lawful for groups. What is restricted is the practice of law and
accountancy together in one business entity, and this is prohibited both for individual lawyers and
accountants, as well as for groups of those respective professionals. In other words, the activity of
engaging in a “joint law-accountancy practice” is prohibited for all, and not merely for groups.
Similarly, restricting the ability of a group of willing farmers to sell their products outside a
marketing regime to a group of willing buyers does not engage s. 2(d) because the relevant
prohibition is of the association, by contract, of buyer with seller, not of sellers with each other. In
the marketing scheme individual sellers (and buyers) are treated the same as group sellers (and
buyers). It is the activity of contracting between buyer and seller that is restricted for both
individuals and groups. (Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision on this very fact pattern in
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157
(S.C.C.), does not articulate this analysis fully, but rather rests on proposition that while s. 2(d) may
protect a trading association it does not protect the activity of trading, and the somewhat bald, albeit
undoubtedly accurate, proposition that s. 2(d) is not intended to protect all economic associations.)
The characterization of what activity is in fact lawful in such cases will determine whether s. 2(d) is
engaged. Some may regard this as an artificial or arbitrary dependence on categories, but the reality
is that the delineation of all legal rights, even those protected as Charter rights, depends to some
extent on such characterizations.
8
The Court’s recognition in its early jurisprudence, e.g., Alberta Reference, supra, note 6,
at 391, per Le Dain J., at 407, per McIntyre J. and Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 401-402,
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unless a given activity could be pursued lawfully by an individual, that
mere fact (the absence of a so-called “individual analogue”) disentitled the
activity from section 2(d) protection. It was not until 2001, in the Court’s
decision in Dunmore,9 that this situation was corrected.
Dunmore advanced the theoretical understanding of section 2(d) by
explaining (in a passage that was in fact obiter)10 that the demonstration
by a claimant that the state has prohibited an activity pursued in
association but not the individual analogue of that activity is not the only
circumstance where a section 2(d) breach may be found. To put it
another way, a showing that the state has interfered with an association’s
activities, but has not restricted the same activity when pursued by an
individual, is a most useful indicium of a section 2(d) infringement, but
it is not the sine qua non. The impairment of an activity that lacks an
individual analogue thus can constitute an infringement of section 2(d),
although it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for finding a
breach.11
As Dunmore pointed out (drawing upon Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent in
the Alberta Reference),12 not every human endeavour that is pursued in
association has an individual analogue. Dunmore recognized that some
associational activities (such as the formation of a majority platform) do
not or cannot have an individual analogue since they are, by their nature,
interpersonal or social.13
Some associational activities that necessarily do not have an
individual analogue include (and here the writer is expanding and
generalizing upon some of the examples cited in Dunmore):

per Sopinka J., of a category in addition to the two mentioned here, extending s. 2(d)’s protection to
the constitutional rights of individuals when pursued in association is clearly redundant or as
Dickson C.J.C. put it “derivative”: Alberta Reference, id., at 364, per Dickson C.J.C. The
constitutional rights are protected in any event; and the protection of activities pursued by a group
which an individual may lawfully pursue clearly encompasses the constitutionally protected
activities of individuals.
9
Supra, note 4.
10
What was found to be an infringement of s. 2(d) in Dunmore, id., was an impairment of
the ability of farm workers to establish and maintain workers’ associations to assert their interests
against private farm employers, which falls well within the scope of the Court’s earlier
jurisprudence on what s. 2(d) protects. What was controversial in Dunmore was not the finding on
this point, but rather the Court’s attribution of responsibility to the state for the inability of farm
workers to organize, thus justifying the Court’s order that the state had to enact legislation
protecting organizing efforts.
11
Dunmore, id., at paras. 16-18.
12
Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 367, per Dickson C.J.C.
13
Dunmore, supra, note 4, at paras. 16-17.
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adopting a model for group decision-making (such as consensus
decision-making, majoritarian decision-making, or decision-making
based on the support of a plurality of a group’s members; open
balloting or secret balloting);
choosing a leader or spokesperson;
developing a platform or shared vision;
adopting or amending a constitution;
establishing criteria for membership in a group, or criteria for
exclusion;
expelling dissenters, or welcoming or readmitting dissenters;
federating, or sub-dividing or splitting;
debating;
team-building;
engaging in competition amongst members of a group;
pooling resources.

Many of these embrace union activities of a centrally associational
nature, and Dunmore removed the barrier to their being protected by
section 2(d).
This does not mean, of course, that to impair an activity that lacks an
individual analogue is to breach section 2(d). Dunmore explicitly
recognized this:
… the law must recognize that certain union activities — making
collective representations to an employer, adopting a majority political
platform, federating with other unions — may be central to freedom of
association even though they are inconceivable on the individual level.
This is not to say that all such activities are protected by s. 2(d) nor that
all collectivities are worthy of constitutional protection; indeed, this
Court has repeatedly excluded the right to strike and collectively
bargain from the protected ambit of s. 2(d).14

Some human activities that lack an individual analogue are the scourge
of humanity. Engaging in warfare, excluding individuals or minorities from
group participation on racial or other invidious grounds, suppressing the
views or goals of dissenters, assimilating minorities, plotting conspiracies,
establishing trade cartels: these are human endeavours that can really only
be pursued in association, and yet that mere fact would not favour their
protection under the Charter.

14

Dunmore, id., at para. 17.
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VI. PROTECTION FOR AN ASSOCIATION’S OBJECTS
Dunmore, by rejecting the individual analogue test for a section 2(d)
claim, was taken by some to herald an “opening of the door” to the
protection of the objects of associations, including what was said to be a
key object of trade unions — collective bargaining.15
However, the rejection in Dunmore of the individual analogue
requirement does not in principle extend section 2(d) protection to one
particular class of association’s objects or activities, even if it is claimed
that the object or activity is essential or foundational to the association. It
merely removes an obstacle that, before Dunmore, would have been fatal
to the claim for section 2(d) protection of those union activities that lack
individual analogues.
Dunmore did not reject the concept that section 2(d) protects only
the association not its objects, even if the objects are the reason for the
association’s existence. This point had been made in the Alberta
Reference16 by reference to the example of a gun club, which does not by
its existence as an association extend section 2(d) protection to gun
ownership, possession or use simply by virtue of the fact that these are
the foundational objects of the club. That a ban on guns would frustrate
the very objects of the association, undermining the meaningfulness of
its existence as an association, does not render the gun ban vulnerable to
attack under section 2(d). The legislation does not, in banning guns,
attack the association qua association. Justice Sopinka adopted this form
of argument in the Professional Institute case to reject the claim that
without constitutional protection for the activity of collective bargaining
the freedom of association of trade unions is meaningless.17 Similarly, in
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, in a non-labour context,
the Court repeated that a prohibition on marketing of farm products
outside a regulatory scheme does not impair the freedom of association
of a farm marketing association.18 Only the association’s activity of
marketing is affected by the legislation, not the association itself. This is

15
See e.g., the references to union counsel’s arguments in Health Services and SupportFacilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2107, 19 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 37, at para. 96 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services, BCSC”], affd [2004] B.C.J. No.
1354, 243 D.L.R. (4th) 175, at paras. 31-32, 67-68 [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services, BCCA”].
16
Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 404-405.
17
Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 402, per Sopinka J.
18
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, supra, note 7, at paras. 108-12.
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so, even though marketing was the raison d’être of the association and
its prohibition would render the association “meaningless”.
Dunmore stated, “the purpose of s. 2(d) commands a single inquiry:
has the state precluded activity because of its associational nature,
thereby discouraging the collective pursuit of common goals?”19 It also
quoted Dickson C.J.C.’s Alberta Reference dissent on the same point:
“The legislative purpose which will render legislation invalid is the
attempt to preclude associational conduct because of its concerted or
associational nature.”20 In the same vein, Dickson C.J.C. had also stated:
What freedom of association seeks to protect is not associational
activities qua particular activities, but the freedom of individuals to
interact with, support, and be supported by, their fellow humans in the
varied activities in which they choose to engage. But this is not an
unlimited constitutional license for all group activity. The mere fact
that an activity is capable of being carried out by several people
together, as well as individually, does not mean that the activity
acquires constitutional protection from legislative prohibition or
regulation.21

Dunmore concluded on this point by stating that, “a purposive approach
to s. 2(d) demands that we ‘distinguish between the associational aspect
of the activity and the activity itself’”.22
All of this is more consistent with the view that section 2(d) does not
protect activities just because they are the foundational objects of an
association23 than the proposition advanced by the dissenters in the 1990
19

Dunmore, supra, note 4, at para. 16 (emphasis added).
Dunmore, id., at para. 16, quoting Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 367, per Dickson
C.J.C. (emphasis added).
21
Alberta Reference, id., at 366, per Dickson C.J.C.
22
Dunmore, supra, note 4, at para. 18.
23
Chief Justice Dickson was prepared to extend protection to collective bargaining and the
right to strike, partly because he thought, “If freedom of association only protects the joining
together of persons for common purposes, but not the pursuit of the very activities for which the
association was formed, then the freedom is indeed legalistic, ungenerous, indeed vapid”: Alberta
Reference, supra, note 6, at 362-63, per Dickson C.J.C. But his comment quoted in the text above
(cited supra, note 21) that s. 2(d) should not protect an activity merely because it is carried on in
association implies that s. 2(d) also does not protect an activity merely because it is the foundational
object or raison d’être of an association. It would not make sense if it were held that s. 2(d) does not
protect activities merely because they could be carried on in association, but does in fact protect
activities that are foundational to an association. A given activity, not otherwise protected, would
acquire protection simply by becoming an activity foundational to a particular association. Bringing
a given activity within the scope of s. 2(d)’s protection would be a matter of limiting the
association’s objects to the activity in question. Unlike a tax shelter, constitutional protection should
not be achievable merely by the craft of a clever solicitor.
20
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Professional Institute case that collective bargaining attracts section 2(d)
protection because it is the raison d’être of a union.24
With Dunmore the terms of section 2(d) debate had not fundamentally
changed, and the Court continued to work within the basic principled
framework established in the Alberta Reference and Professional Institute
cases, albeit with an important, and probably valid limitation on the
significance of the individual analogue test.

VII. THE UNIONS’ CLAIMS IN B.C. HEALTH SERVICES —
ARTICULATION AND CRITIQUE
1. The “Freedom” Claim
In B.C. Health Services, the unions presented their claims in the form
of a classical section 2 claim: that of government interference in a freedom
protected by the Charter. Unlike the situation in, for example, Dunmore or
Delisle v. Canada,25 which involved exclusions from a whole collective
bargaining regime, the legislation at issue in B.C. Health Services lent itself
to the union’s characterization of their claims, since it constrained an
activity — collective bargaining — that formerly, it was claimed, the
unions had been “free” to engage in unencumbered by legislative
restrictions on what could be bargained.
The unions claimed that by setting aside terms in previously “freely”
negotiated collective agreements and precluding “free” negotiations over
certain terms in future collective agreements (substituting legislated
terms instead), the B.C. legislation was interfering in three “core labour
freedoms”:
(1) the freedom to make collective representations to one’s employers;
(2) the freedom to negotiate and agree on the terms and conditions of
employment in a collective manner; and,
(3) the ability to rely on and enforce those agreements which are
collectively concluded.26
The first of these enumerated freedoms — the freedom to make
collective representations — is not controversial. It is a freedom
24
25

Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 381-83, per Cory J.
Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989

(S.C.C.).
26

B.C. Health Services, BCCA, supra, note 15, at paras. 30 and 70. See also Appellants’
Factum in the Supreme Court of Canada, paras. 27, 33-36, 74, 88-114, 125.
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specifically mentioned in Dunmore.27 Quite apart from Dunmore, this
freedom is protected in the public sector context by the operation of section
2(b) and (d) of the Charter, and the principle that section 2(d) protects the
exercise in association of the constitutional rights or freedoms of
individuals.28 This freedom does not, however, encompass collective
bargaining, as collective bargaining involves much more than the
presentation of collective representations to an employer.
The second and third of these claimed freedoms are controversial. The
third, “the ability to rely upon and enforce” agreements, is not a claim for
freedom at all, but a demand for the legal enforcement by the state of
bargains concluded collectively. Such enforceability is essential to give
effect to the second claimed freedom, the freedom to bargain collectively.
As such, the second and third claimed freedoms may be read together as
“the freedom to collectively bargain and conclude binding agreements
without state interference”.
Interestingly this claimed freedom has a readily recognizable, and in
some quarters notorious, individual analogue: laissez-faire freedom of
contract.29
Naturally, the unions in B.C. Health Services did not put their claim
forward as starkly as a claim for laissez-faire freedom of contract. The
B.C. Court of Appeal encapsulated the claimants’ position on the second
and third claimed freedoms by quoting from their submissions:
The appellants’ ultimate position is that … “Regardless of what labour
relations scheme a province may choose to enact regarding collective
bargaining, it cannot prohibit the collective negotiation and
enforcement of employment agreements. While there may not be a right
to any particular labour relations framework, there is at least a right to
remain free from state interference in carrying out this type of
collective activity.”30

A look at the individual analogue to this claimed collective freedom —
individual freedom of contract — sheds light on the problems with the
unions’ claim.

27

Dunmore, supra, note 4, at para. 17.
Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 391, per Le Dain J., at 407, per McIntyre J.;
Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 401-402, per Sopinka J.
29
See Robert E. Charney, “The Contract Clause Comes to Canada: The British Columbia
Health Services Case and the Sanctity of Collective Agreements” (2007-2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 65.
30
B.C. Health Services, BCCA, supra, note 15, at para. 33 (emphasis added). See also
Appellants’ Factum in the Supreme Court, paras. 27, 33-36, 74, 88-114, 125.
28
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First, it is trite that, especially in the sphere of employment, there is
no unrestrained freedom of contract. The unions contended that the state,
having established a scheme that leaves certain prescribed parties free to
settle the terms of a contract, cannot withdraw that freedom and impose
contractual terms. Such an argument is not materially different from a
claim that having permitted individual employees and employers to
agree to terms of employment above the minimum standards prescribed
by the Employment Standards Act, the state cannot by legislation set
aside agreed-upon terms or impose new terms of employment. We know
that that is not true. The unions’ argument is also not materially different
from a claim that having adopted a laissez-faire posture to the labour
market in the 19th century the state was then precluded from legislating
employment standards or adopting labour relations codes in the 20th and
21st centuries. Yet we know that state regulation of employment
relationships has been a hallmark of post-19th century labour relations
policy, and it is indisputable that organized labour has been a primary
beneficiary of such state intervention. We have a situation where the
unions cannot claim that an activity lawfully open to individuals is not
open when carried on collectively by associations. Unrestrained freedom
of contract is lawfully prohibited for both individuals and collectivities.
Second, and more significantly, the unions’ claimed “freedom of
collective bargaining” is quite inseparable from a complex and prescriptive
statutory regime that establishes a process for the fixing of terms and
conditions of employment at certain workplaces. The unions’ recharacterization of but one aspect of that prescriptive statutory scheme as a
“freedom” may have some rhetorical value, but it hardly reflects what the
statutory scheme provides and how it actually works.
The statutory regime in question, like the labour relations model
prevalent in North America, prescribes that all workers in a given
bargaining unit (as defined by law) are to be represented exclusively by a
bargaining agent certified by a board31 established by legislation.
Workers who dissent from the majority’s choice of bargaining agent are
nonetheless bound to representation by that agent. The employer is
compelled by the statute to bargain terms and conditions of employment
31
Exclusive bargaining agents may also be designated by statute or regulation, rather than
certification (e.g., public service and teacher bargaining agents are often statutory agents:
Professional Institute, supra, note 6, and Ontario Teachers’ Federation v. Ontario (Attorney
General), [2000] O.J. No. 2094, 49 O.R. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “O.T.F. v. Ontario”]).
Exclusive bargaining agents may also be voluntarily recognized by the employer without a
certification process: Labour Relations Act, 1995, supra, note 5.
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with the bargaining agent, and is prohibited from bargaining with anyone
else, thus ensuring that the bargaining agent has a statutory monopoly on
the labour available to the employer. Both employer and bargaining
agent have a “duty to bargain”, enforced by the state. The statute
prescribes sanctions, in the event of a breach of the duty to bargain, and
regulates resort to economic remedies (such as strikes and lock-outs)
available to the parties in the event of a failure of negotiations.32
The unions’ real claim in B.C. Health Services, therefore, was a
claim that the state, having set up a regime which gives certified
bargaining agents exclusive representation on behalf of labour at the
workplace, having imposed a statutory duty to bargain on the bargaining
agents and the employers, and having prescribed remedies and sanctions
in the event of default, was: (1) in some cases, “interfering” with the
“freely contracted” terms that the bargaining agents and employers
reached, and (2) in other cases, precluding negotiations over certain
terms and conditions of employment.
The unions in B.C. Health Services certainly did not want a bare
freedom, unhindered and unassisted by the state, to bargain and conclude
agreements collectively. They wanted the rest of the state-imposed
collective bargaining regime as well, including, most particularly, the
exclusive representation provisions, the ability to compel an employer to
bargain with them and the remedies and sanctions prescribed for default
or a failure of negotiations.
In the writer’s respectful view, one cannot take from the fact that the
B.C. statutory regime includes a measure of “freedom to negotiate”
between certified bargaining agent and employer that this “freedom” is a
constitutionally protected freedom, whether under section 2(d) or
otherwise. The correlative statutory rights of bargaining agent and
employer established by the typical North American labour relations
model can equally be seen to be prescriptive rather than permissive in
nature: it is not that the freedom to bargain is protected, but rather that a
duty to bargain is imposed. The regime, therefore, cannot be conceived
of as an instantiation of a fundamental freedom. Rather, it is a labour
code that reflects complex industrial relations, economic and social
policy choices.33
32

Labour Relations Act, 1995, id., ss. 7-10, 15-17, 53, 55-57, 63, 79, 96, 98-99 and 104;
George W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2d ed., loose-leaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2005), at
2-16 to 2-32.2, 2-54.1 to 2-72.10 and 2-98 to 2-106.
33
Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 391, per Le Dain J.
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Voluntary, freely formed associations play a role in the statutory
scheme only in the sense that trade unions (which are typically voluntary,
non-statutory associations) can organize workers in a bargaining unit and
then obtain statutory certification as the exclusive bargaining agent for that
bargaining unit if supported by majority vote of the workers in the
bargaining unit. But in their statutory role they are engaged in a highly
regulated activity that has no resemblance to the exercise of a freedom.
What happened over the course of time in the last century is that, like other
voluntary private associations such as law societies in the 19th century,
trade unions acquired a statutory role. That trade unions enjoy and exercise
freedom of association qua voluntary associations does not mean that the
statutory role that they also play is itself an exercise of that freedom.
This writer submits that the relevant association for an analysis of
the freedom under section 2(d) is that represented by the voluntary
coming together of individuals. The fact that freely formed associations
can acquire a role as bargaining agents by statute does not mean that the
bargaining unit — the very group of workers for whom collective
bargaining is undertaken — is itself a freely formed association. Qua
exclusive bargaining agent a trade union does not represent the coming
together or association of workers under section 2(d). The typical labour
statute does not provide for “freedom of association” for the bargaining
unit. While it is true that a majority vote of the bargaining unit members
generally determines whether a given trade union is certified as
bargaining agent, the composition of the bargaining unit is not
determined by free choice. In the typical North American model, the
bargaining unit is workplace based — i.e., statutorily confined to a
category of workers at a given employer’s workplace. Garment-workers
in a province can voluntarily band together to form a garment-worker’s
union, and the union can federate with other unions, or sub-divide into
smaller entities, as the membership may freely choose, all without state
interference. Yet a bargaining unit of garment-workers at one employer
cannot decide to merge with another unit of garment-workers at some
other employer, or with some or all garment-workers city- or provincewide. Similarly, it is not left to the unfettered choice of workers in a
bargaining unit whether they wish to sub-divide the unit in a manner that
reflects their preferences or interests. That matter is often left to labour
boards to determine in accordance with labour policy criteria that serve
many more goals than are reflected in the free choice of a class or subclass of employees. Indeed, it is frequently the case that a specialized
sub-class of employees with greater relative bargaining power would
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prefer not to be associated with other employees in their bargaining unit.
There may be labour policy reasons to leave them in despite their
wishes, because, for example, the fragmentation of the bargaining unit
would reduce the bargaining leverage of the less-skilled workers.34
Further, bargaining unit members cannot choose to leave a bargaining
unit (except by quitting their employment) nor can they choose not to be
represented by the certified bargaining agent, unless they secure, through
a statutorily prescribed process, the decertification of the bargaining
agent: this typically depends on obtaining a majority vote of bargaining
unit members, and is an option available only periodically.35
In summary, in the typical statutory labour relations model,
bargaining unit members’ freedom to negotiate employment terms,
whether individually or in collectivities of their own choosing and
design, is replaced with a system by which the terms and conditions of
employment are fixed by negotiation between the employer and a
statutorily empowered bargaining agent. In the statutory model, the
bargaining unit membership is afforded a measure of choice — whether
to join or support a trade union that seeks certification as bargaining
agent, whether to support decertification of the bargaining agent,
whether to support a collective agreement that has been reached between
bargaining agent and the employer, whether to strike. But those choices
are highly regulated and circumscribed by the legislation, and all the
choices of individuals and dissenting groups are subordinated to the will
of the majority. This is said to be in the best interests of the collectivity
of employees as a whole, as it is intended to improve their over-all
bargaining power, and if that in turn improves bargaining outcomes for
the collectivity, this is said to improve their overall welfare. Paul Weiler
put it thus:
Only if the employees can be welded into a single cohesive group
presenting a unified format to the employer can they exercise sufficient
countervailing power to influence significantly their overall terms of
employment.36

Some may claim that the prescriptive or compulsory elements of the
statutory scheme — its subordination of free choice to other goals — are
themselves in the service of some wider concept of “freedom of
34
Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law
(Toronto: Carswell, 1980), at 126 [hereinafter “Reconcilable Differences”].
35
Labour Relations Act, 1995, supra, note 5, ss. 7-10, 15-17, 63.
36
Reconcilable Differences, supra, note 34, at 126 (emphasis added).
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association”. The evidence of expert witnesses called in support of a
constitutional challenge to the exclusion of principals and vice-principals
from a teachers’ bargaining unit ran along these lines. 37 The witnesses
were of the view that membership of the principals and vice-principals in
the teachers’ unit should be compulsory because it served the freedom of
association of teachers as a whole. Moreover, in contrast to mandatory
membership, it was freedom of choice that was truly “coercive”:
Witness 1:
Q. Do you think that by making principals and vice-principals who
would rather not be part of the federation, by making them be
members of the federation, that it enhances their ability to
provide collegial leadership?
A. Yes, whether they like it or not it does.
Q. It’s good for them?
A. Yes.
Q. That is because the teachers perceive them to have the same values
even though they may not?
A. Yes.
Witness 2:
Q. So your position is that mandatory membership gives principals
choice but voluntary membership doesn’t give them choice?
A. Yes.
.....
Q. What if we abolish statutory membership in the Ontario
Teachers’ Federation altogether and we just said everybody,
teacher, principal, join it or don’t join it as you choose, what
would you think of that as a policy?
A. I would find that very coercive.
Unlike these witnesses, among others, this writer confesses skepticism
about an approach to freedom and choice that interprets the prescriptive or
compulsory elements of a statutory regime as the instantiation of freedom.
Whether or not the statute legitimately furthers valid policy objectives, it is
a fundamental error in principle to say that its prescriptive elements in fact
foster freedom. We are better to acknowledge plainly that sometimes we
37

O.T.F. v. Ontario, supra, note 31, affg [1998] O.J. No. 1104, 37 C.C.E.L. (2d) 56 (Ont.
Gen. Div.).
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legitimately subordinate free choice (whether it be individual or collective
choice, and whether it be constitutionally protected in a given context or
not) to policies pursued for broader ends. It is a disservice to legal
reasoning, not to mention reason in general, to do otherwise.
Notwithstanding Rousseauean notions of being “forced to be free”
and Marxist ideas of “false consciousness”, this writer suggests that
Isaiah Berlin held the preferable view on this issue:
[N]othing is gained by a confusion of terms. To avoid glaring
inequality, or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of
my freedom: I may do so willingly and freely; but it is freedom that I
am giving up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow
men. … [A] sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed,
namely freedom, however great the moral need or the compensation
for it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness
or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. … [I]t
is a confusion of values to say that although my ‘liberal’, individual
freedom may go by the board, some other kind of freedom — ‘social’
or ‘economic’ — is increased.38

2. The Claim for “Meaningful” Protection
Returning now to the claimants in B.C. Health Services, having
presented their claims as claims to freedom from state interference, they
proceeded to argue that the collective aspect of free collective bargaining
attracts the protection of section 2(d) on the basis that bargaining and
concluding enforceable collective agreements is one of the main objects
— in fact the foundational object — of their associations. They asserted
that constitutionally guaranteeing their freedom to bargain collectively
was the only way to ensure that their freedom of association was
“meaningful”. The legislature’s interference in, and in some cases
preclusion of, collective bargaining, the unions claimed, rendered their
very associations pointless or “meaningless”.
“Meaningful” was the word chosen by the Court in Dunmore to
explain the extent to which the legislature had to go to protect the
organizing rights of farm workers in the face of a proven inability to
organize without statutory assistance.39 The adoption of a posture of
restraint on the part of the legislature meant, according to the Court, that
38
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, reproduced in The Proper Study of Mankind:
An Anthology of Essays (London: Pimlico, 1998) 191, at 197.
39
Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at paras. 20, 23, 67 (S.C.C.).
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the workers’ freedom to organize — and hence their freedom of
association — was not “meaningful”. The Court stated the question as
follows:
In this context, it must be asked whether, in order to make the freedom
to organize meaningful, s. 2(d) of the Charter imposes a positive
obligation on the state to extend protective legislation to unprotected
groups.40

It made the following factual finding:
… the evidentiary burden has been met in this case: the appellants have
brought this litigation because there is no possibility for association as
such without minimum statutory protection. 41

And it granted a remedy in the following language:
… at minimum the statutory freedom to organize in s. 5 of the LRA
ought to be extended to agricultural workers, along with protections
judged essential to its meaningful exercise, such as freedom to
assemble, to participate in the lawful activities of the association and to
make representations, and the right to be free from interference,
coercion and discrimination in the exercise of these freedoms.42

As noted above, up to and including Dunmore, the Court remained
committed to distinguishing between an association and its objects. The
use by the Court of the word “meaningful” to describe a minimum
constitutional standard of associational ability that, in the context at issue
in Dunmore, required statutory support, does not imply that the objects
of an association gain constitutional protection on the ground that the
failure to protect the objects means that the association’s freedom is not
“meaningful”.
The complaint in B.C. Health Services that the unions’ objective of
collective bargaining was interfered with, and therefore their freedom of
association was rendered “meaningless”, misinterprets Dunmore’s
protection of “meaningful freedom of association” as a guarantee of a
“freedom of meaningful association”, i.e., a guarantee of the essential
objects of an association. Dunmore’s use of the word “meaningful” in the
context of its discussion of section 2(d) consistently emphasizes the
importance of making the freedom guaranteed by section 2(d) meaningful.
40
41
42

Id., at para. 20.
Id., at para. 42.
Id., at para. 67.
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Section 2(d) does not guarantee that associations themselves will be
meaningful by guaranteeing their objects.
3. Special Status versus Neutrality
As clearly recognized in the Court’s earlier section 2(d)
jurisprudence, the extension of section 2(d) protection to the objects of
an association, would be tantamount to a general constitutional
guarantee of the liberty to pursue any object, provided it was pursued in
concert.43 Guaranteeing the foundational or essential objects of an
association, or its raison d’être, would have the same result, since
bringing a given activity within the scope of section 2(d)’s protection
would be a matter of limiting the association’s objects to the activity in
question. This would also require the section 1 justification of any
limitation or regulation of an activity that could be pursued in concert.
To read into section 2(d) a guarantee of collective bargaining
because it is a main object of a trade union would mean that the main
object of any association would have to be recognized by section 2(d),
unless, for some reason, a trade union should receive special status,
within section 2(d), entitling it to the protection of its objects even
though the objects of other associations are not so entitled. Prior to B.C.
Health Services the Court had repeatedly stressed that section 2(d)
should be interpreted in a manner that is mindful of its potentially broad
application.44
A neutral approach to section 2(d), one that does not privilege some
kinds of associations, such as trade unions, over other kinds of
associations, has its virtues. Giving the judiciary the role of deciding
which associations are worthy of having their objects and activities
protected, and which are not, is really just asking the judiciary to select
among a range of objects and activities as meriting constitutional
protection, under the rubric of protecting freedom of association. It also
moves the locus of decision-making over which associations’ activities
43
Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.), at 404-405, per
McIntyre J.; at 366, per Dickson C.J.C.; Professional Institute, [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2
S.C.R. 367 (S.C.C.), at 401-402, per Sopinka J.; at 392-93, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Canadian Egg
Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157, at paras. 104-105, 108,
110-112 (S.C.C.).
44
Alberta Reference, id., at 390-91, per Le Dain J.; R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.,
[2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, at paras. 179-181 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.; Professional
Institute, id., at 401-402, per Sopinka J. and 393-94, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.
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are worthy, and which unworthy, from the legislatures to the judiciary. It
is hard to discern in section 2(d) an intention to license the judiciary to
substitute its value judgments for the legislature’s in relation to the
worthiness of different associations and/or their objects. One would have
thought that the purpose of section 2(d) was to protect associating
generally from these kinds of value judgments, whether they be made by
the legislature, the executive or the judiciary.
The neutral approach is the one taken to the other section 2 rights,
notably section 2(a)’s protection of freedom of religion and section
2(b)’s protection of freedom of expression. When considering the scope
of section 2(a) or (b) the Court does not adjudicate the value of a religion
or its tenets, or the value or content of a given exercise of freedom of
expression. Section 2(a) and (b) contain no judicially created hierarchy
of religions or speech. Rather religion and speech enjoy a categorical and
abstract scope of protection under section 2 of the Charter. The question
of whether the freedom to engage in a given religious practice or to
engage in certain speech should yield to the public interest in a
particular context is addressed in section 1, when the state seeks to
justify specific legislative limits on the particular religious practice or
speech.45 Section 1 allows for the kind of context-specific, evidencebased inquiry (where the burden of justification is on the state) that is
appropriate to assessing whether a broad freedom ought to yield to the
public interest in a particular situation.
Applied to section 2(d), the neutral approach, as the earlier
jurisprudence recognized, restricts itself to the protection of associating
itself, not the objects pursued in association. This, the writer submits,
enables section 2(d) to have a broad and liberal scope.

45
With respect to s. 2(b) consider: Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989]
S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.); Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, esp. at 246-47 (S.C.C.); RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at 330-31 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J.
(as she then was); R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney
General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] S.C.J. No. 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.); Robin K.
Basu, “Selected Issues on Evidence in Charter Cases: The RJR – JTI Saga, Lessons Learned and
Unresolved Issues” (2007-2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 107. With respect to s. 2(a), see Syndicat Northcrest v.
Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.).
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VIII. THE MAKING OF THE REVOLUTION: HOW THE COURT DEALT
WITH THE CLAIMS IN B.C. HEALTH SERVICES
At the hearing of the appeal in B.C. Health Services in February
2006 the seven members of the Supreme Court who sat gave no
indication of the dramatic change that was in the offing. In fact,
Bastarache J., the author of the Dunmore majority opinion, specifically
rejected the suggestion made to the Court by union counsel that
Dunmore opened the door to Charter protection of collective bargaining:
the Court, he retorted, would have to go “well beyond” Dunmore for the
claim to be accepted. Conversely, it was also obvious that certain
members of the Court were singularly unimpressed with the B.C.
legislation before them.
The parties had to wait 16 months for a decision.
The decision that came in June 2008 shattered the previously
accepted understanding of section 2(d). The conceptual architecture of
the Court’s section 2(d) jurisprudence laid down from 1987’s Alberta
Reference through to and including Dunmore seemed to be swept away,
with no coherent theory of section 2(d) to replace it. It seemed to be a
revolution without a program.
The Court identified what it called a “procedural right collective
bargaining”, also referred to several times as a “collective right to good faith
negotiation and consultation”, and, based on four disparate “propositions”,
granted that right constitutional protection under section 2(d).
1. Rejection of the Earlier Jurisprudence
At the outset, as the “first proposition”, the Court dismantled the
foundations for its earlier jurisprudence that had rejected section 2(d)
protection for collective bargaining. Most significantly, the Court
attacked the validity of what this writer has described above as the
neutral approach to section 2(d) rights. The Court claimed that that the
“overarching” problem with the earlier jurisprudence, particularly the
Alberta Reference and the Professional Institute case, was that they took
a “decontextualized” or “generic” approach to freedom of association,
which treated all associations as having the same associational rights.
This was said to be inconsistent with the purposive approach to Charter
rights:
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… the majority judgments in the Alberta Reference and PIPSC [the
Professional Institute case] adopted a decontextualized approach to
defining the scope of freedom of association, in contrast to the
purposive approach taken to other Charter guarantees. The result was
to forestall inquiry into the purpose of that Charter guarantee. The
generic approach of the earlier decisions to s. 2(d) ignored differences
between organizations. Whatever the organization — be it trade union
or book club — its freedoms were treated as identical.46

The Court did not elaborate on why the approach taken in the Alberta
Reference and subsequent cases was not “purposive” in the sense that it
sought to ground the interpretation of section 2(d) in the purposes and
values underlying the right. A review of the early section 2(d)
jurisprudence shows considerable judicial attention being paid by both the
majority judges and dissenters to an examination of what values were
sought to be reflected in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association.47 Whatever one’s quarrels with the conclusions reached by the
justices in the early cases, it cannot seriously be contended that their
approach was not purposive. As pointed out above, the “decontextualized”,
or neutral, approach, in refraining from privileging certain associations and
their activities over others, bears considerable similarity to the approach
taken to section 2(a) and (b).
The main point made by the Court in B.C. Health Services to
demonstrate that the early jurisprudence was not “purposive” was to say
that all associations were treated as having identical rights under
freedom of association, and as a result the “unfortunate effect was to
overlook the importance of collective bargaining — both historically and
currently — to the exercise of freedom of association in labour
relations”.48 What this seems to be saying is that the relevant purposive
inquiry is to inquire into the purpose of a given activity to see if it merits
constitutional protection, not to inquire into the purposes and values
underlying the constitutional guarantee to determine its meaning and
scope. If this is indeed what the Court is saying, it seems that the Court
has moved more towards the role of constitutional legislator (at least
with respect to section 2(d)), assessing whether as a matter of
constitutional policy a given activity merits constitutional protection
under section 2(d), rather than constitutional interpreter seeking to
46

B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
Alberta Reference, supra, note 43, at 334, 361-68, per Dickson C.J.C.; 390-91, per
LeDain J.; 393-99, 403-409, per McIntyre J.
48
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 46, at para. 30.
47
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discern, though a purposive and contextual analysis, the meaning and
scope of section 2(d).
This presents the very danger, discussed above, that departing from a
neutral approach to freedom of association simply lets the judiciary
decide, using context-dependent criteria developed case by case, which
activities, when pursued in association, merit constitutional protection
and which do not. This is not as drastic an outcome (feared by both
majority and dissent in the Alberta Reference) as automatically
extending section 2(d) protection to activities merely because they are
pursued in association, but it nonetheless invites questions about the
legitimacy of the judiciary’s role in undertaking such a task.
One clear consequence of the approach adopted in B.C. Health
Services is to sanction the “balkanization” of the section 2(d)
jurisprudence in a way that has not occurred with the other section 2
freedoms. The extent of freedom of association to be accorded to
different organizations will vary, in accordance with an analysis of
context and the application of criteria developed by the Court case by
case. Another consequence is considerable legal uncertainty for the
foreseeable future, as different types of associations bring claims for
section 2(d) protection that can only be assessed by reference to the
particular context and criteria deemed relevant at the time.
The Court explicitly acknowledged the concern found in the earlier
jurisprudence that section 2(d) was not intended to automatically protect
the innumerably varied activities that might be pursued in association:
“the underlying concern — that the Charter not be used to protect the
substantive outcomes of any and all associations — is a valid one”.49
This concern, the Court stated, had given rise to the stance (notably
consistent in the jurisprudence from the Alberta Reference through to
and including Dunmore) that section 2(d) does not protect the objects of
an association, necessitating that a distinction be drawn between “the
associational aspect of the activity”, which is protected, and “the activity
itself”, which is not.
Yet the Court also explicitly rejected the idea that the distinction
between the associational aspect of an activity and the activity itself can
in fact be drawn:
… it will always be possible to characterize the pursuit of a particular
activity in concert with others as the “object” of that association.

49

Id., at para. 29.
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Recasting collective bargaining as an “object” begs the question of
whether or not the activity is worthy of constitutional protection. 50

Thus, it seems that the problem the Court sees as a legitimate
concern is the risk of extending constitutional protection to all activities
pursued by all associations, and not the idea, expressed repeatedly in the
earlier jurisprudence, that the purpose of section 2(d) is to protect
associating itself, i.e., the coming together in pursuit of common goals,
not the goals that may be pursued by way of coming together. But if the
purpose of section 2(d) is not to protect just associating itself, as opposed
to the myriad of ends achievable by associating, then what is its
purpose? The Court seems to offer no answer.
Despite the Court’s apparent confidence in disposing of the
distinction between an association and its objects, it was impelled to
draw a distinction between the “process” of collective bargaining and its
“outcomes”:
… “collective bargaining” as a procedure has always been
distinguishable from its final outcomes (e.g., the results of the
bargaining process, which may be reflected in a collective agreement).
… In our view, it is entirely possible to protect the “procedure” known
as collective bargaining without mandating constitutional protection
for the fruits of that bargaining process. Thus, the characterization of
collective bargaining as an association’s “object” does not provide a
principled reason to deny it constitutional protection.51

This distinction, between the process and outcomes of collective
bargaining is new to section 2(d) (and section 2 in general),52 and really
does not answer in a meaningful way the concern that section 2(d) is
intended to protect the associational aspect of an activity as opposed to
the activity itself. The distinction seems to be aimed at separating
associational means (the process of collective bargaining — protected by
section 2(d)) from associational ends (collective agreements — not
protected by section 2(d)). Yet, to return to the example of the gun club,
pooling resources for the purchase of firearms is clearly only the means
or “process”, pursued associationally, by which the club seeks to achieve
its goal of gun possession, ownership and use. And, of course, gun
50

Id.
Id.
52
See Jamie Cameron, “Due Process, Collective Bargaining and Section 2(d) of the
Charter: A Comment on B.C. Health Services” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 131 [hereinafter “Due
Process, Collective Bargaining and Section 2(d)”].
51
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possession, ownership and use could either be ends in themselves, or
merely the means to further ends, such as self-defence or enjoyment of
the sport of marksmanship. The distinction, therefore, between process
or means, on the one hand, and outcomes or ends, on the other hand,
does no work to meet the challenge of establishing an appropriate scope
for the section 2(d) right.
Curiously, though, later in the judgment a great deal of reliance
seems to be placed by the Court on the process/outcome distinction in
the collective bargaining context. This will be discussed further below.
The Court also rejected the earlier jurisprudence on a number of
other grounds. It noted that, as held in Dunmore, the individual analogue
test for a section 2(d) infringement was not sound. This issue has been
discussed at some length above.
The Court also stated that the early cases wrongly advocated an
approach that was too deferential of government in labour relations
matters. Yet little was offered in the judgment to address the very
extensive reasoning in the earlier cases in favour of judicial restraint in
the policy-laden and highly political arena of labour relations regulation.
For example, in the Alberta Reference, McIntyre J. stressed the grave
difficulties that would face the judiciary in conducting a section 1 review
of the legislature’s myriad of labour relations policy choices if a
constitutional right to collective bargaining (or its incidents, such as the
right to strike), were to be included in section 2(d):
… There is clearly no correct balance which may be struck giving
permanent satisfaction to the two groups, as well as securing the public
interest. The whole process is inherently dynamic and unstable. Care
must be taken then in considering whether constitutional protection
should be given to one aspect of this dynamic and evolving process
while leaving the others subject to the social pressures of the day.
.....
If collective bargaining were constitutionalized under section
2(d), my worry is that judges might be flooded with
arguments from litigants who are unhappy with the current tilt
in the balance of power between unions, employers, and
individual employees in collective bargaining legislation.
These litigants will challenge a particular aspect of collective
bargaining law, citing vague arguments of democratic,
associational, economic, or political rights that will only serve
to confuse the judge. Other parties whose interests will be
affected by the decision may not receive intervenor status or
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may not even be aware of the case. It is unlikely that the
necessary evidential base to decide the policy issue will be
provided. When we consider that collective bargaining law is
polycentric in nature, adjustments to the delicate industrial
relations balance in one part of the system might have
unanticipated and unfortunate effects in another.
The lessons of the evolution of our labour law regime in the
past 50 years display very clearly that the legislatures are far
better equipped than the courts to strike the appropriate
balance between the interests of the individual employee, the
union, the employer and the public. … The courtroom is not
the place to be developing collective bargaining policy.
… The section 1 inquiry involves the reconsideration by a court of the
balance struck by the Legislature in the development of labour policy.
… There are no clearly correct answers to these questions. They are of
a nature peculiarly apposite to the functions of the Legislature. 53

The institutional inappropriateness of having the judiciary rebalance
labour relations policy in the context of a section 1 analysis remains as
much a concern today as it did when that case was decided, and has been
reflected in the Court’s labour jurisprudence ever since.54 In a passage
reminiscent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous dissent in
Lochner v. New York,55 the Court in Dunmore echoed the need for
53
Alberta Reference, supra, note 43, at 414, 418, 419, per McIntyre J., quoting Joseph M.
Weiler, “The Regulation of Strikes and Picketing under the Charter” in Litigating the Values of a
Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Joseph M. Weiler & Robin M. Elliot, eds.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986), at 226-27.
54
Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989,
at paras. 28, 33 (S.C.C.); R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3
S.C.R. 209, at paras. 156-62, 239 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.
55
Lochner v. People of the State of New York, 198 U.S. 45, at 75-76, per Holmes J.
dissenting (1905). Justice Holmes recognized the dangers inherent in granting constitutional
protection to a particular economic, labour or employment relations policy, such as, in that case,
laissez-faire approaches to contracts of employment:

This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study
it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of
this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we
as legislators might think as injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and which,
equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. … [A] Constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural
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significant judicial deference in the assessment of legislative choices in
the field of labour relations policy:
[T]o exclude a given occupation from the LRA “involves a weighing of
complex values and policy considerations that are often difficult to
balance” and … this balancing “will in large part depend upon the
particular perspective, priorities, views, and assumptions of the policy
makers, as well as the political and economic theory to which they
subscribe”. Similar statements have been made about labour relations
generally, which have been described as “an extremely sensitive
subject” premised on “a political and economic compromise between
organized labour — a very powerful socio-economic force — on the
one hand and the employers of labour — an equally powerful socioeconomic force — on the other (Alberta Reference, supra, per
McIntyre J., at p. 414). Policy choices are based on value judgments.
This Court will only interfere with such choices where a more
fundamental value is at stake and where it is apparent that a free and
democratic society cannot permit the policy to interfere with the right
in the circumstances of the case.56

Instead of confronting the justifications advanced in this jurisprudence,
the Court in B.C. Health Services simply declared that judicial restraint had
been carried too far.57 The baldness of the Court’s claim offers no answer to
the legitimate concern that section 1 of the Charter, in particular, is not a fit
tool to enable the courts to undertake the task of balancing the multifaceted
policy concerns involved in government regulation of labour relations.
Most significantly, the Court rejected the earlier jurisprudence’s
understanding of collective bargaining in its modern incarnation as not a
“fundamental freedom” but rather a statutory right that is but one strand
in the fabric of a prescriptive labour relations regime. In the view of the
Court in B.C. Health Services the modern statutory form of collective
bargaining does not prevent collective bargaining from meriting
constitutional status:
… the fundamental importance
relations was the very reason
Legislatures throughout Canada
bargaining rights as sufficiently

of collective bargaining to labour
for its incorporation into statute.
have historically viewed collective
important to immunize them from

and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.
56
57

Dunmore, supra, note 39, at para. 57.
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 46, at para. 26.
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potential interference. The statutes they passed did not create the right
to bargain collectively. Rather, they afforded it protection. There is
nothing in the statutory entrenchment of collective bargaining that
detracts from its fundamental nature. 58

Notably, this passage stresses the “fundamental” nature of collective
bargaining, without attempting to describe it as a freedom. Nor is there
any acknowledgment, either here or in the Court’s later examination of
Canadian labour history,59 of the relevant distinctions that might exist
between pre-statutory collective bargaining, undertaken freely by
workers in association,60 on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
statutory collective bargaining which operates by way of a prescriptive
regime mandating exclusivity and the duty to bargain, as discussed at
length above. Herein lies the root problem of the B.C. Health Services
decision.
After dismantling the earlier jurisprudence, the Court proceeded to
outline three remaining “propositions” which it said support a finding
that collective bargaining — specifically a “procedural right to collective
bargaining” — is protected by section 2(d). The propositions are, first,
that the history of collective bargaining shows its fundamental nature,
second, that international instruments protect collective bargaining and
third, that collective bargaining furthers certain values that find
expression in other parts of the Charter.
Consistent, it seems, with the “contextualized” approach, none of
these three propositions are statements about the nature of section 2(d);
rather they are observations about collective bargaining. The Court does
not attempt to replace the principles it rejected with any theory of section
2(d)’s nature or scope. It is in fact, somewhat unclear which, if any, of
the principles of the previous jurisprudence remain valid. It may be that
all of the earlier section 2(d) claims in all contexts are subject to being
revisited under the new contextualized approach.
As will be seen, however, the contextualized approach and its
application in the B.C. Health Services case offers very little guidance as
to how section 2(d) claims should be handled in the future. Neither the
three propositions deployed in B.C. Health Services to support section
2(d) extension to collective bargaining, nor the contextualized approach
58

Id., at para. 25.
Id., at paras. 40-68.
60
Accompanied by other non-statutory measures such as recognition strikes intended to
induce employers to bargain.
59
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itself, offer assistance in predicting whether a given activity of a given
association will receive section 2(d) protection. In fact, it is submitted,
the three propositions and the contextual approach seem to be largely
devoid of normative force. It is unclear why the propositions, taken
together, lead to the conclusion that collective bargaining ought to
receive section 2(d) protection.
2. Labour History
The Court’s proposition that the history of collective bargaining and
its treatment in Canadian law before the Charter show its fundamental
importance is supported by a lengthy dissertation on labour history.61
The accuracy of the Court’s treatment of this history is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, it is in elaborating this history that the Court
introduces the fundamental misconception in its judgment: that the
collective bargaining right in its modern form can be likened to a
fundamental freedom. The Court asserts that collective bargaining long
pre-dates its statutory incarnation. That is undoubtedly true: in fact, it is
likely that workers exercised freedom to come together in groups, or
trade guilds, or associations, to bargain for better terms or working
conditions for as long as humans have been bargaining. But this offers
no reason to regard the collective bargaining features of the modern
statutory regime as the same species of activity.
The Court points out that the long history and importance of
collective bargaining was the reason that legislatures enacted collective
bargaining statutes, thus creating the modern collective bargaining
regime:
… As society entered into the industrialized era, “workers began to
join unions and to engage in collective bargaining with their
employers. Although employers resisted this development with all the
resources at their command, it eventually became apparent that unions
and collective bargaining were natural concomitants of a mixed
enterprise economy. The state then assumed the task of establishing a
framework of rights and responsibilities within which management and
organized labour were to conduct their relations.”62

While this may explain why collective bargaining statutes themselves
are important to “a mixed enterprise economy”, it does not offer a reason
61
62

B.C. Health Services, supra, note 46, at paras. 40-68.
Id., at para. 42.
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why constitutional protection for collective bargaining is required in
addition to the incorporation of collective bargaining features in the
modern statutes. There is no real explanation here of a normative or policy
rationale to bring collective bargaining within constitutional as opposed to
statutory protection.
All the while, the Court fails to acknowledge that with the enactment
of collective bargaining regimes, collective bargaining was transformed
from an activity with a voluntary associational aspect into something
with a compulsory character. It remained associational, but the relevant
association for purposes of statutory collective bargaining — the
bargaining unit — was not itself a free association; and the activity of
statutory collective bargaining became in fact compulsory for both
bargaining agents and employers.
The Court’s quotation from Professors Fudge and Glasbeek’s
description of the transformation wrought to collective bargaining by its
statutory incorporation is telling, once emphasis is added to the relevant
words:
For the first time in Canada’s history, the government compelled
employers to recognize and to bargain with duly elected
representatives and/or trade unions. From the workers’ perspective,
this constituted a movement from having a right to state their interest
in being represented by a union to having enforceable legal right to
have their chosen representative treated as a union by their employer.
There was no longer any need to use collective economic muscle —
always seriously limited by the common law — to obtain the right to
bargain collectively with employers.63

The picture is completed when it is also noted that the trade unions
themselves are compelled to bargain collectively under the statute, not
merely for their own members, but also for those workers who, as
Professor Weiler put it, “belong to other unions and even those who
want nothing to do with any union”.64
To be fair, the Court does not remain completely silent in response
to the B.C. government’s argument that modern collective bargaining is
a statutory right:
The respondent argues that the right to collective bargaining is of
recent origin and is merely a creature of statute. This assertion may be
true if collective bargaining is equated solely to the framework of
63
64

Id., at para. 59 (emphasis added).
Reconcilable Differences, supra, note 34, at 125 (emphasis added).
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rights of representation and collective bargaining now recognized
under federal and provincial labour codes. However, the origin of a
right to collective bargaining in the sense given to it in the present case
(i.e., a procedural right to bargain collectively on conditions of
employment), precedes the adoption of the present system of labour
relations in the 1940s.65

This passage suggests that the Court does acknowledge that there is a
material difference between non-statutory collective bargaining and the
inclusion of collective bargaining in modern labour statutes. But what
the Court fails to acknowledge is that the essential difference between
the statutory and pre-statutory forms of collective bargaining is the
introduction of compulsion to replace voluntariness, and that this is
fundamental to the consideration of whether collective bargaining in its
modern form is constitutionally protected as a freedom.
One may be led to conclude from this passage that the Court is not
purporting to constitutionalize the modern form of collective bargaining,
but only its voluntary, pre-statutory progenitor. This possibility is belied
by the Court’s insistence, later in the judgment, that the constitutional
right to collective bargaining implies a corresponding duty to bargain on
the part of the employer66 — a duty foreign to any non-statutory,
voluntary model of collective bargaining. It is also belied by the
outcome in the case, namely the invalidation of legislation that sought to
interfere with the product and scope of statutory collective bargaining.
As part of its recitation of history, the Court discusses the comments
on collective bargaining of the Acting Minister of Justice before the
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons that was
formed to consider the draft constitutional resolution at the federal level.
The Court does not note that the comments were made in opposition to a
motion to amend the draft text of section 2(d) to read “freedom of
association including the freedom to organize and collective bargaining”,
which was defeated 20-2.67 The defeat of the motion suggests a
legislative intention to exclude rather than include the claimed right,
assuming that the intentions of a federal legislative committee are even
relevant when considering an instrument that was the product of
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B.C. Health Services, supra, note 46, at para. 41.
Id., at paras. 90, 99-107.
67
Dianne Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour Law and the Charter” (2002) 40 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 369, at 371.
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negotiations among multiple governments and enacted by the Parliament
at Westminster, not Ottawa.
The Acting Minister’s comments are quoted by the Court as follows:
Our position on the suggestion that there be specific reference to
freedom to organize and bargain collectively is that that is already
covered in the freedom of association that is provided already in the
Declaration or in the Charter; and that by singling out association for
bargaining one might tend to d[i]minish all the other forms of
association which are contemplated — church associations; associations
of fraternal organizations or community organizations. 68

In the writer’s view, the Acting Minister’s comments do not disclose an
understanding that the modern form of collective bargaining (with its
compulsory features including the duty to bargain) is intended to be
included in freedom of association. Rather, it suggests something much
less than that, for the comments clearly explain that other associations,
such as religious, fraternal and community organizations, should not be
“diminished” relative to trade unions in regard to the protections offered
by section 2(d). Yet it can hardly be contemplated that the objects of
religious organizations, such as, for example, the conversion of nonadherents, were intended to receive section 2(d) protection. The
interpretation of the Acting Minister’s comments that makes sense of
them as a whole is that freedom of association would protect the
freedom to organize (which it clearly does) and to collectively bargain,
should it ever come to pass that a legislature was minded to introduce the
kinds of legal disabilities on union organizing and voluntary collective
bargaining that characterized the 19th century. The writer ventures to
add that the Acting Minister would never have assented to the theses that
a “procedural right to collective bargaining” enshrined in the Charter
would mean that the state could not by legislation set aside the terms of a
negotiated collective agreement. Yet that was the outcome of the B.C.
Health Services case.
Regardless of the details of labour and legislative history, an
important question arises as to the significance of this historical factor
for future cases involving section 2(d) rights. The kind of prominence
that collective bargaining has in the historical record recited by the
Supreme Court may or may not be shared by other associational
activities for which section 2(d) protection is sought. A given activity’s
68

B.C. Health Services, supra, note 46, at para. 67.
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(or association’s) place in the pre-Charter historical record is an entirely
contingent matter. Some kinds of associations may be able to point to a
long and important history; others perhaps not. It is unclear whether the
emphasis placed on history in B.C. Health Services disentitles an
associational activity from consideration for section 2(d) protection if it
lacks the requisite pedigree. If that is the case, then section 2(d) would
be plagued by the “frozen concepts” approach that undermined the
efficacy of the federal Bill of Rights69 in the 20 years leading up to the
Charter. This also raises the question as to whether the contingencies of
history should be relevant at all to what should be a normative inquiry on
whether constitutional protection extends to a given associational
activity.
3. International Law
The Court’s next “proposition” supporting the inclusion of collective
bargaining in section 2(d) is the existence of international instruments
dealing with labour rights. The accuracy of the Court’s treatment of
international labour law is a matter for others to examine.70
What cannot go without comment, however, is the Court’s adoption of
Dickson C.J.C.’s statement in the Alberta Reference that, “the Charter
should be presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection as is
found in the international human rights documents that Canada has
ratified”.71 This proposition represents a dramatic shift from the
conventional understanding that the federal government’s execution on
behalf of Canada of an international instrument represents at its highest a
commitment to enact such domestic legislation as may be required to give
effect to the international instrument. (It certainly does not create
enforceable domestic law.72) Because an international human rights
obligation can be, and generally is intended to be, fully implemented
simply by the enactment of domestic legislation, it should not be the case
that an international law obligation can give rise to a presumption of
incorporation in the domestic constitution. Further, the government is
usually at liberty to withdraw from an international instrument in
69

Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
See, e.g., Brian Langille, “Can We Rely on the ILO?” (2007) 13 C.L.E.L.J. 363.
71
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 46, at para. 70, citing Alberta Reference, supra, note
43, at 349, per Dickson C.J.C.
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B.C. Health Services, id., at para. 69.
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accordance with prescribed terms. It would be odd if shifting international
commitments altered the content of the Canadian Constitution.
It is also necessary to observe that there will be a strong disincentive
for the federal government to agree to new international human rights
obligations in emerging or hitherto neglected fields if to do so creates a
presumption of constitutional interpretation that the obligations are also
contained in the Charter.73 Conversely, a federal government with an
agenda that seeks to further the constitutionalization of a controversial
right or interest (e.g., a right to bear arms, property rights, or the absolute
right to an abortion) could very well enter into a treaty on the subject
with similarly minded foreign governments in the hope of creating a
presumption of Charter protection.
In addition, there are problems faced by the provinces in this regard.
The provinces may or may not be consulted with respect to the federal
government’s treaty-making plans. It would be odd if the federal
government’s treaty making could, by operation of the resulting
constitutional presumption, undermine both Canadian federalism and the
amending formula in the Constitution.
Lastly, recourse to international law, like reliance on history, is
something that is not necessarily available in any given case to show
whether a given associational activity warrants inclusion in section 2(d).
Some associational activities may find expression in international law,
others may not. It is unclear whether Charter protection will depend
upon finding an “international analogue”.
4. Charter Values
The Court’s final proposition in favour of section 2(d) protection for
collective bargaining is that it furthers certain values reflected elsewhere
in the Charter. The Court cites the values of democracy, liberty,
autonomy, dignity and equality. The Court’s recitation of values found
in other sections of the Charter is particularly interesting given the
absence, noted above, of any real discussion of how the values
underlying section 2(d) in particular actually favour the inclusion of
collective bargaining.
73
In the period after B.C. Health Services was released the federal government has declined to
sign a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as a proposal to
recognize water as a human right, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2007/07/13/
aboriginal-march.html>; <http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/409003>.
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In considering Charter values, the Court makes no effort to determine
whether any Charter values run counter to the inclusion of collective
bargaining in section 2(d). The values of individual liberty, personal
autonomy and dignity, reflected in the fundamental freedoms themselves
and in section 7, would seem to be at best only equivocally served by those
features of collective bargaining that necessitate the subordination of
individual choice to the needs and wishes of the collectivity. The
democratic principles of majoritarianism reflected in collective bargaining
regimes could be seen to be somewhat at odds with the Charter’s antimajoritarian features, particularly its protections for dissenting individuals
and groups. “Solidarity”, the traditional union value which justifies the
subordination of the individual to the collectivity, is not itself a discernible
Charter value. Even the values that the Court has found underlying the
section 15 equality guarantee — human dignity and the assessment of
individuals on their actual needs, capacities and circumstances rather than
presumed and stereotypical group characteristics74 — do not seem to
accord fully with such typical features of collective bargaining as the
seniority system.75
Left undiscussed in the Court’s decision is whether the promotion of
Charter values is necessary for an activity to merit inclusion in section 2(d).
If it is, it would seem that a great many organizations and associational
activities would be excluded from consideration, as they are dedicated to
values that do not find expression in the Charter. Organizations dedicated
to or celebrating the values of charity, thrift, productivity, magnanimity,
humility, sporting prowess or military sacrifice, among others, would not
seem to be fostering specifically “Charter values”. A neutral analysis would
focus on the values underlying freedom of association itself, rather than
attempt to find a match between an association’s values and those in other
parts of the Charter.

74
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.).
75
The Court in fact notes the importance of such features as seniority and bumping rights
(under which more senior employees can avoid lay-off by “bumping” junior employees from their
jobs): Health Services, supra, note 46, at para. 130: “… bumping rights are an integral part of the
seniority system usually established under collective agreements, which is a protection of significant
importance to the union. ‘Seniority is one of the most important and far-reaching benefits which the
trade union movement has been able to secure for its members by virtue of the collective bargaining
process’”.
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5. Conclusion on the Court’s Section 2(d) Analysis of Whether
Collective Bargaining is Protected
In the writer’s respectful view, the Court’s section 2(d) analysis in B.C.
Health Services suffers from an absence of principle and excess of
context.76 Even if the Court is asserting that it is entitled to make
constitutional policy without reference to the interpretation or development
and application of principles of general application, we are left without any
real articulation of (i) how the policy factors taken into consideration by the
Court (the three propositions just discussed) are related to the values and
purposes underlying section 2(d), (ii) why the factors carry the normative
weight that the Court seems to ascribe to them, (iii) whether they are
necessary conditions for section 2(d) protection in other contexts, and (iv)
what other factors, or kinds of factors, could be relevant to section 2(d)
protection.

IX. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1. Process versus Outcome
After deciding that a procedural right to collective bargaining is
covered by section 2(d), the Court went on to discuss its characteristics.
As mentioned above, the Court confined section 2(d) protection to the
process of collective bargaining as opposed to its outcomes. It also stated
that the right was general in nature and did not protect a particular model
of labour relations.
… the protected activity might be described as employees banding
together to achieve particular work-related objectives. Section 2(d)
does not guarantee the particular objectives sought through this
associational activity. However, it guarantees the process through
which those goals are pursued.
.....
… as the right is to a process, it does not guarantee a certain
substantive or economic outcome … the right is to a general process of
collective bargaining, not to a particular model of labour relations, nor
to a specific bargaining method.77
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See, on this same issue, “Due Process, Collective Bargaining and Section 2(d)”, supra,

note 52.
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Due to the nature of the Court’s section 2(d) analysis, we do not
have a ready explanation for the process/outcome distinction. As we
have seen, the distinction seems to distinguish means from ends, but this
does not forestall the risk of section 2(d) protecting a wide range of
associational activities that can be characterized as means to an
association’s ends. If only the ultimate objective (the substantive
outcome) is excluded from associational protection, but the intermediate
ends that are means to the ultimate end do enjoy section 2(d) protection,
the distinction has not done much work.
In the writer’s view, the distinction does very little work at all in the
case of collective bargaining. For it is necessary to consider what the
distinction is actually excluding from the ambit of section 2(d)’s
protection in the labour relations context. The Court explains in the
passage quoted above that what the distinction excludes from protection
is “a certain substantive or economic outcome”. This is not saying much.
For it is quite inconceivable how section 2(d) could possibly guarantee a
particular economic outcome. The notion that freedom of association
somehow guarantees a particular wage or wage increase is absurd. If so,
then it is hard to discern what part of collective bargaining has actually
been excluded from the ambit of section 2(d). It would seem that all of
collective bargaining is protected, and certainly anything that can be
characterized as a means or a process.
There is a further difficulty. The Court’s claim that only process and
not substance is protected is belied by the actual result in B.C. Health
Services. On finding that the procedural right to collective bargaining
had been infringed without justification under section 1, the Court
invalidated the B.C. legislation that had altered past collective
bargaining outcomes. In the result, the bargaining outcomes of past
negotiations were protected from legislative interference. One would
have thought that in the face of an infringement of the procedural right
to collective bargaining, the remedy would have been an order that the
parties comply with the required procedure — namely to go back to the
bargaining table. What we have instead is a remedy that effectively
restores the previously achieved bargaining outcome. In a wry comment
in the Canadian Western Bank case released just a week before B.C.
Health Services, Binnie J. noted that, “it is wise to look at what the
courts do as distinguished from what they say”.78 This wisdom suggests
78
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that contrary to the claim of a process/outcome distinction, at the very
least past bargaining outcomes really are protected by section 2(d).
2. Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
The Court held that the duty to bargain in good faith is part and
parcel of the procedural right to collective bargaining. The duty rests on
both the employer and the employees:
… the state must not substantially interfere with the ability of a union
to exert meaningful influence over working conditions through a
process of collective bargaining conducted in accordance with the duty
to bargain in good faith. Thus the employees’ right to collective
bargaining imposes corresponding duties on the employer. It requires
both employer and employees to meet and to bargain in good faith, in
the pursuit of a common goal of peaceful and productive
accommodation.79

This, the writer submits, is indicative that notions of freedom of
association have been mixed up in B.C. Health Services with the
modern, statutory form of collective bargaining, in which the parties are
compelled to negotiate with each other. Constitutional protection appears
to be extended not to voluntary, free collective bargaining, but rather to a
compulsory process. In fact, unlike the situation with other section 2
freedoms, the right-holders do not appear even to have a choice as to
whether to exercise their right, for they, like their employers, are
required to bargain.
Another anomaly here is that a duty to bargain is imposed on
employers under the fundamental freedom of freedom of association.
Yet under freedom of speech under section 2(b) there is no duty (even
upon the government) to listen to speech uttered by the right-holder.
This is so, even though imposing a constitutional duty to listen would
certainly make the section 2(b) right more “meaningful”.
B.C. Health Services addresses only the public sector employer’s
duty to bargain. It further suggests that private sector employees do not
enjoy a constitutional right, similar to that of their colleagues in the
public sector, that compels their private employers to bargain with them.
The Court states:
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… The Charter applies only to state action. One form of state action is
the passage of legislation. In this case, the legislature of British
Columbia has passed legislation applying to relations between health
care sector employers and the unions accredited to those employers.
That legislation must conform to s. 2(d) of the Charter … A second
form of state action is the situation where the government is an
employer. While a private employer is not bound by s. 2(d), the
government as employer must abide by the Charter, under s. 32 …80

Generally, of course, private employees are covered by the Labour
Relations Act or its equivalent in other jurisdictions, and those regimes
impose a statutory duty to bargain upon private employers. There are
certain classes of employees, such as Ontario farm workers, who are not
covered by collective bargaining legislation that imposes a duty to
bargain. It is contended in the farm worker litigation in Ontario81 that the
legislature is obliged under section 2(d) to enact a collective bargaining
regime for farm workers that would require private farm employers to
bargain with the exclusive bargaining agent selected by majority vote at
the farm workplace. If this contention is accepted it would have the
effect of requiring the state, pursuant to the Charter guarantee of freedom
of association, to compel a private employer to deal exclusively with the
majority-supported employee association, and to refuse to recognize and
freely bargain with a minority-supported association of workers at that
workplace. While such a requirement from a labour policy perspective
may be seen as unremarkable, that it could be mandated by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is astonishing. It
remains to be seen what the courts will do with this claim in light of B.C.
Health Services.
3. Substantial Interference
The Court, drawing from the Dunmore case, held that only a
“substantial interference”, by government conduct or legislation, with
the procedural right to collective bargaining would infringe section
2(d).82 It is not necessary for the interference to be intentional;
substantially interfering effects are sufficient.83 The Court elaborated that
80
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“[t]o constitute substantial interference with freedom of association, the
intent or effect must seriously undercut or undermine the activity of
workers joining together to pursue the common goals of negotiating
workplace conditions and terms of employment with their employer that
we call collective bargaining”.84
Although the Court indicated that each case would be fact specific,
examples of substantial interference could include: “union breaking”
legislation, acts of bad faith (presumably in negotiations), and “unilateral
nullification [through legislation] of negotiated terms, without any
process of meaningful discussion and consultation”.85
The last cited example, the voiding of negotiated terms and the
substitution of legislative terms was what was found to be constitutionally
offensive in the B.C. Health Services case.86 In addition, the Court held on
the facts of B.C. Health Services that legislative prescription of terms so as
to preclude future negotiations was also a breach of section 2(d). This
covers terms that not only were the subject of negotiations (whether or not
they made their way into an actual agreement), but also those that could
have been negotiated.87
It is hard to overstate implications of this proposition, which
effectively grants constitutional protection to the content of collective
agreements, subject only to the state justifying legislative interference
under section 1 of the Charter. As Robert Charney has noted, it appears
that the Court has imported into the Charter discredited American
constitutional notions protecting the inviolability of contracts.88 With
B.C. Health Services, though, contracts seem to be inviolable only if
they are collective agreements concluded between trade unions and
employers. B.C. Health Services goes even further by precluding
legislative interference with potential collective agreements, not merely
actual ones.
What this means is that the hierarchy of laws in this country has
apparently been turned topsy-turvy: contracts had formerly been treated
as a source of law for the relations between the parties, and entirely
subject to democratically enacted statute law and judge-made common
84
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law. Now, the species of contract known as the collective agreement has
been elevated to a status above statute law, subject only, it seems, to
limits under section 1 of the Charter.89
The procedural right to collective bargaining seems to indicate that,
subject perhaps only to section 1, governments are constitutionally
restricted in effecting change and making law in areas covered by actual
or potential collective agreements: instead of legislating they must
negotiate in good faith with trade unions. And, as discussed further
below, based on the section 1 analysis applied in B.C. Health Services, it
appears that a failure to negotiate or consult in advance of legislating
will be fatal to any section 1 justification that might be offered by
government.90
The implications of this transformation of the legal order are all the
more astounding when it is realized that the areas covered by actual or
potential collective bargaining and collective agreements has grown over
the last few decades to embrace far more than traditional terms of
employment.91 Unions, particularly in the public sector, have asserted a
greater desire to deal in negotiations, under the auspices of addressing
“working conditions”, with what are not merely of concern to employees
but are also fundamental issues of public policy. Examples range from
the provision of weapons to police officers, border officials and even
transit workers, to the content and delivery of the public school
curriculum and school testing, to the accommodation of persons with
disabilities. The operation, closure, relocation or reorganization of public
facilities, such as hospitals, prisons, universities and electrical generating
stations, directly implicate the broader public interest, and yet the
government’s ability to pursue the public interest through legislative or
regulatory measures is now subject to the vagaries of the collective
bargaining process.
For the first time in Canadian history, the permissible ambit of a
legislative initiative seems to be governed by the past negotiating
history, and present and future negotiating intentions, of trade unions
with employers. Consider, for a moment, the position of a government
policymaker or adviser seeking to develop a legislative initiative to
address a pressing issue or implement a newly elected government’s
89
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., vol. 2, loose-leaf supplemented
(Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2007), at 44-9.
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platform. In order to determine whether the government can act free of
constitutional risk — and whether the government can proceed without
first engaging in good faith negotiations or consultations with trade
unions to address the issue — the policymaker or adviser must determine
whether any collective agreement will be affected by the proposed
legislation. He or she must further consider (how, it is not clear) what the
confidential negotiating history has been with trade unions on issues that
could be affected by the legislation. It must also be determined whether
the legislation might preclude negotiations over some aspect of an area
that a trade union might possibly want to deal with in future
negotiations. On the logic of B.C. Health Services this would appear to
be the case not merely with public sector unions, but also with private
sector unions and employers. B.C. Health Services states that section
2(d) not only binds government employers, it also prevents the legislator
from displacing or precluding collective bargaining, and this presumably
includes collective bargaining in the private sector.92 The result of this is
what the writer submits is an intolerable degree of constitutional
uncertainty with respect to broad swathes of public policy.
Further, it offers the prospect of the patchwork constitutionality of
legislation. In the case of some sectors, institutions or companies, there
will be no history, intention or hope of collectively bargaining a
particular issue that stands to be affected by a legislative measure. Yet in
relation to another sector, institution or company, the existence of such a
history, intention or hope on the part of a trade union will mean that the
legislative measure would be at constitutional risk on section 2(d)
grounds.
With all of this, we are left to wonder how it is that the past or future
bargaining conduct of certain parties can possibly determine the content
and application of a constitutional norm.
Some consideration might also be given to the implications of the
transformation brought about by B.C. Health Services from the
perspective of parties engaged in collective bargaining (whether it be in
the public or private sector). Prior to B.C. Health Services it was
understood by the parties that legislation governing certain terms and
conditions (e.g., pension legislation, or occupational health and safety
rules, or other regulations that affect the workplace) established a frame
of reference within which negotiations might take place. With B.C.
92

B.C. Health Services, supra, note 82, at para. 88. It is notable that the legislation in B.C.
Health Services applied to some private sector employers: Id., at para. 8.

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

REVOLUTION AND AFTERMATH

207

Health Services one wonders whether parties to collective bargaining
can simply ignore legislated terms affecting terms and conditions of
employment on the basis that they were enacted unilaterally and thus
unconstitutionally preclude bargaining the issue. The frame of reference
for bargaining appears to have been lost. Without it, where does
bargaining start? What are the ground rules?
B.C. Health Services offers very little to resolve these quandaries.
The Court, seemingly in an effort to introduce a limiting principle to the
scope of the section 2(d) right, averred that “if [a] subject matter is of
lesser importance to the union, then it is less likely that the section 2(d)
right to bargain collectively is infringed”.93 Yet the Court’s offer of
nothing but trivial examples of matters that might be considered of
“lesser importance” suggests that virtually anything of substance can be
treated as of sufficient importance to trigger the section 2(d) right:
… measures affecting less important matters such as the design of
uniform, the lay out and organization of cafeterias, or the location or
availability of parking lots, may be far less likely to constitute
significant interference with the s. 2(d) right of freedom of
association.94

When applying the principles it has developed to the legislative
provisions at issue in B.C. Health Services, the Court seems to be
inconsistent in its approach to determining whether a legislative
prescription impermissibly removes a subject matter from the scope of
potential collective bargaining. For the most part, the Court treats the
legislative imposition of terms so as to preclude future negotiations over
those terms as an infringement of section 2(d).95 However, in the case of
B.C.’s repeal of a job retraining and financial support program for laid
off employees, the Court held that because the program did not
originally emerge from a past process of collective bargaining and
depended on the authority of the government for its existence (rather
than being within the control of employer and employees), the repeal did
not offend section 2(d):
The ESLA did not arise out of collective bargaining but, rather, was
imposed by the government on health sector employers pursuant to the
recommendations of an inquiry committee. Since neither the ESLA nor
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the HLAA was the outcome of a collective bargaining process,
modifying them cannot constitute an interference with past bargaining
processes. Further, since the ESLA and HLAA rely heavily on the
authority of the government for their existence, and are outside of the
power of health sector employees and employers, there is no potential
for future collective bargaining over matters relating to either the
ESLA and HLAA. Since there can be no future collective bargaining
relating to the ESLA or the HLAA, there can be no interference with
future collective bargaining over these matters either. It follows that
neither s. 7 nor s. 8 has the purpose or effect of interfering with
collective bargaining, past or future. 96

We may take some comfort from the Court’s affirmation that the
legislative repeal of a program that had its genesis outside collective
bargaining does not engage section 2(d) right. But it is hard to
understand how the fact that the legislation was not the subject matter of
past collective bargaining can be determinative, when its existence may
very well have been taken into account in past bargaining. The program
was presumably part of the frame of reference in which bargaining took
place.
What this tells us, though, is that the law (particularly statute law)
must provide the frame of reference for collective bargaining, and that
collective bargaining must be subordinate to the law, not the other way
around.

X. SECTION 1
In B.C. Health Services the relationship between section 1 and the
protected collective bargaining right under section 2(d) is not clear. It is
stated in the exposition of section 2(d) that if the government wishes to
effect change on matters of importance it should negotiate them in lieu
of proceeding unilaterally by way of legislation.97 One takes from this
that following a process of good faith consultation and negotiation prior
to legislating complies with section 2(d).
On the facts of B.C. Health Services the B.C. government did not
engage in consultations or negotiations prior to legislating. In the Court’s
section 1 analysis the Court seems to treat the government’s failure to
consult as going to the issue of whether the legislation in question was
96
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minimally impairing of a Charter right. The B.C. government’s failure to
consult was held not to be minimally impairing.98
Yet it would seem that the failure to consult and negotiate is what
gave rise to the section 2(d) breach in the first place. The failure to
consult thus appears both to determine the breach of section 2(d) and
also to disentitle the government from relying on section 1 because it
cannot pass the minimal impairment test when it fails to consult.
If this is so, it is hard to see how section 1 can come to the assistance
of the government at all, except perhaps in the situation of, “essential
services, vital state administration, clear deadlocks and national crisis”,
in which the Court suggests that the state may be able to justify limits on
the collective bargaining process on an “exceptional and typically
temporary basis”.99
Given that the facts in B.C. Health Services involved a government
that did not consult, the judgment does not tell us whether a process of
good faith but unsuccessful consultation and negotiation followed by
unilateral government action in light of the failure of negotiations will be
analyzed under section 2(d) or section 1. This will need to be worked out
in future cases.
An important section 1 issue arising from the inclusion in section
2(d) of a right to collective bargaining received only scant attention in
the majority decision in B.C. Health Services. It is the question of
whether the right to collective bargaining — a right to a process
designed to improve predominately economic outcomes for workers —
is subject to limits under section 1 of an economic or budgetary nature.
In principle, rights of an economic nature should be subject to limits of
an economic nature.
Only the partial dissent of Deschamps J. acknowledged the
importance of the economic context in the approach to section 1.100
Justice Deschamps noted the legitimacy of the government’s concern
with the unsustainable growth of public health care costs, of which
labour costs were the primary component. She also noted, in particular,
that the B.C. legislation was a response, in part, to the fact that under
previous B.C. governments, the wages paid to the workers represented
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by the claimant unions had risen to a level where they were
approximately 30 per cent higher than in other provinces.101
By contrast, the majority in B.C. Health Services dismissed as
“suspect” the significance of budgetary concerns in its section 1
analysis.102 Yet this ignores the fact that in the case of public sector
labour relations, budgetary concerns impinge directly on important
public interests relating to the availability, quality and sustainability of
public services such as health care, education, policing, the
administration of criminal justice, correctional services and so on.

XI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECTION 2(d) LITIGATION
It can reasonably be anticipated that litigation of legislative initiatives
which are claimed to infringe the section 2(d) right to collective
bargaining will involve an inquiry — under section 2(d) or section 1 —
into the good faith of government and trade union negotiations. Thus,
rather than strictly adjudicating the objective purposes and effects of
legislation, the courts will be hearing evidence and argument on the
subjective intentions of the parties to negotiations as well as the trade
unions’ subjective view as to what was of “importance” to them for
potential future negotiations. It is unclear whether this will adversely
affect the negotiating climate in public sector collective bargaining, if
negotiations are conducted with one eye on potential constitutional
litigation.

XII. ADDITIONAL LABOUR RELATIONS IMPLICATIONS
AND UNCERTAINTIES
There are many other uncertainties arising from the B.C. Health
Services decision beyond those discussed above.
A number of the uncertainties are theoretical and the reasoning in
B.C. Health Services does not provide any satisfactory guidance:
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Who is the right-holder? The collectivity of employees in the
bargaining unit, the individual employees, or the bargaining agent?
What is the relevant association for consideration of the section 2(d)
right to collective bargaining? The bargaining unit that exists by
statute, the trade union that exists by voluntary membership, or the
trade union qua bargaining agent?
Are section 2(d) rights alienable? Can an individual, union, or other
relevant association waive section 2(d) rights in exchange for
economic or other considerations?
What is the status of a dissenting collectivity of workers? Are
dissenters’ section 2(d) rights subsumed in the rights of the
collectivity of workers as a whole? Or can they assert their own
section 2(d) rights?

Many practical uncertainties also arise, but their resolution will
depend in part on the answers to the above theoretical questions —









Is the statutory prescription of bargaining units in the typical labour
relations regime constitutionally permissible, or should the
determination of bargaining units be a strictly voluntary matter?
Can a statute re-order or restructure statutory bargaining units
without running afoul of section 2(d)?103
Are the exclusive representation provisions of the typical labour
relations model permitted, not permitted or mandatory under section
2(d)?
What is encompassed by the procedural right to collective
bargaining? Are remedies for bargaining impasse (including the
right to strike) part of the procedural right?
What are the implications of the section 2(d) right for parity and
balance between labour and management?

At present, as we ponder the aftermath of the B.C. Health Services
revolution, the only certainty is that all of us — government, labour,
management, the public and the judiciary — now inhabit a novel legal
and policy environment, the shape of which will only become clear as
we continue to live, work, negotiate and litigate in it.

103
A decision from the Quebec Superior Court has declared the legislative rationalization of
the more than 3,500 bargaining units in Quebec’s health care sector to be unconstitutional, relying
on an interpretation of B.C. Health Services: Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Québec
(Procureur général), [2007] J.Q. no 13421, 2007 QCCS 5513 (Que. C.S.). The case is under appeal.

